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ABSTRACT 
Left-wing and libertarian individuals are more likely to engage in extra-institutional 
political activism. Yet studies to date have not analysed the relative influence of 
economic redistributive and social libertarian values for the intensity of protest 
participation due to the unavailability of data. By analysing data from a unique cross-
national dataset on participants in mass demonstrations in seven countries, this paper 
addresses this gap in the literature and provides evidence to show the relative impact 
of economic redistributive and social libertarian values for explaining different 
degrees of protest participation. We show that the mechanisms underpinning the 
effect of the two value sets on extra-institutional participation are divergent. While 
both economically redistributive and libertarian social values support extra-
institutional participation, economically redistributive protesters are mobilized to 
political action mainly through organizations, whereas the extra-institutional 
participation of social libertarian protesters is underpinned by their dissatisfaction 
with the workings of democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Progressive values can relate to both economic redistributive or social libertarian 
claims. This study analyses the relative extent to which protest activism is 
underpinned by either set of values. Previous literature has tended to argue that more 
progressive values underpin extra-institutional political participation (Welzel and 
Deutsch 2012). The literature on political attitudes has identified two different 
dimensions in political value: an economic redistributive-free market dimension and a 
libertarian-authoritarian social values dimension (Tilley 2005). The context of the 
recent economic crisis provides fertile ground for such an examination since many 
scholars have argued that the “cultural turn” in social movement activism has been 
redirected through a focus on inequality and redistributive concerns in the wake of 
the Great Recession. As Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 76) argue, events that affect 
large numbers of non-state fields such as large-scale economic crises can “undermine 
the power of incumbents and grant leverage to challengers... but even in more settled 
times, there are routine, low-level conflicts going on constantly in state and nonstate 
strategic action fields.”    
As has been shown before, one of the primary challenges for social movement 
‘organizational entrepreneurs’ is to redefine the ‘rules of the game’ and the terms of 
debate in wider society. The first step in this process involves the realisation that 
present conditions are subject to change and that concerted social and political action 
is amenable to reconfiguring these (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The collective 
identity-formation of social movements plays a large role in this process (Polletta and 
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Jasper 2001). At the individual level, ideology and value commitments recognising 
the potential for alternative social arrangements are key (McAdam 1986). 
While both economic redistributive and social liberal values tend to be 
associated with the progressive end of the spectrum of political beliefs, these two 
types of value commitments do not of necessity need to go hand in hand, nor do they 
imply similar underlying logics of belief . While a more redistributive economic 
policy implies a greater need for governmental action to control, plan, and manage 
the economy, against this, a more social liberal agenda implies the state withdrawing 
to a greater extent from the private sphere. As such, one would expect two different 
logics at play in the extent to which leftist and libertarian values promote protest 
politics.  Supporters of economic redistribution could be seen to be more likely to use 
‘protest as a political resource’ (Lipsky 1968) as marginalised groups, struggling to 
making inroads by other means and thus ‘increase their bargaining ability’ by using 
protest actions as a reliable political tool to establish a group voice in the political 
arena (Gillion 2013).  Instead, for libertarians protest could be seen as an end in itself, 
the objective expression of anti-authoritarianism and their dissatisfaction with the 
political process, particularly in times of crisis.  Rising government surveillance 
across the globe is another trend contributing to anti-government protest (Tarrow 
2015).  Today, as governments increasingly come under fire from contenders from 
both the radical left and the populist right these trends have fed into wider perceptions 
of a legitimation crisis in advanced Western democracies and the end of the post-war 
settlement.  In particular, the expansion of surveillance “to those whose activities are 
merely related to an ongoing investigation, as opposed to raising probably cause of 
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actual involvement in illegal activity, have brought additional civil liberties under 
attack: freedom of association, privacy, the right to a fair trial, and access to 
government information” (Braman 2006: 115).    
Despite the ubiquity of protest in contemporary society only a handful of 
studies distinguish between levels of protest and it is still largely unknown whether 
the extent to which one holds certain types of values can explain differences in 
degrees of protest. Most quantitative studies of protest participation tend to focus on 
the distinction between protesters and non-protesters, making no distinction between 
individuals who are engaged in a great number of unconventional acts and those 
instead who only engage in a few.  In this paper, we employ a novel and unique 
dataset collected in the context of a collaborative European project that allows us to 
distinguish between degrees of protest (Saunders et al. 2012) in turn allowing for a 
more nuanced investigation of the role of values.  What is the relationship between 
political values and extra-institutional participation? And what dynamics underpin the 
relationship between extra-institutional participation and economic redistributive 
versus social libertarian values? 
To analyse these theoretical questions we employ a new and rich dataset 
containing survey data on over 10,000 activists attending 72 demonstrations in seven 
Western European countries between 2009-2013. In what follows we first review 
theories that are linked to understanding the relationship between protest and values; 
we move on to discussing our data and methods; we discuss findings from multi-level 
models; finally, we discuss the implications of our results for our understanding of 
the relationship between protest and values in industrial societies.  
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Since the student movements of the 1960-70s, protest activism and extra-institutional 
forms of political participation have become ubiquitous in post-industrial societies 
(Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). A number of studies from both political sociology 
and political science have argued that post-industrial citizens prefer these new modes 
of campaigning to more traditional types of institutional participation such as voting 
and party membership (della Porta 2015; McAdam et al. 2001; Norris 2002; Dalton et 
al. 2010). This shift in modes of political engagement is often linked to changing 
political values. A number of authors have argued that societal modernization leads to 
the rise of progressive values conducive to extra-institutional political action (Norris 
2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). Research has 
shown a strong link between progressive values and protest across post-industrial 
democracies (Dalton et al. 2010).  These values are particularly important predictors 
of activism in affluent advanced democracies (Dalton and Rohrschneider 2002). 
The role of ideological orientations for political engagement is acknowledged 
in the literature, with protest activism being seen as more common among those 
identifying with the Left (Dalton et al. 2010). There is also evidence from the United 
States that liberals are more likely to engage in protest activism (Dalton 2008).  It has 
been shown in the literature that individuals with more left-libertarian political values 
are more likely to engage in the new Green or New Left parties and social 
movements such as those focusing on the environment and women’s and LGBT 
rights emerging since the late 1960s  (Kitschelt 1988; Barnes and Kaase 1979; 
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et al. 1995, 1992). These values also have a role for differentiating participants in 
different types of movements. 
Both political sociologists and political scientists include measures of liberal 
values in models to explain participation in social movement activities (Verba et al. 
1997). Studies in political sociology have importantly distinguished between two 
different value dimensions: economic redistributive-free market and social 
libertarian-authoritarian (Evans et al. 1996; Tilley 2005). However, studies of 
political participation do not set a clear distinction between the economic 
redistributive-free market and social libertarian-authoritarian dimensions . As such, 
while there is disparate evidence that social libertarian and economic redistributive 
values all impact on protest activism, it remains unclear whether the same processes 
underpin the impact of different values on various types and intensities of protest 
participation.  
We agree with scholars arguing that it important to understand what explains 
different levels of protest activism (Saunders et al. 2012; Verhulst and Walgrave 
2009; Passy and Giugni 2001; Klandermans 1997). Considering the ubiquity of 
protest in advanced democracies, it has become particularly important to understand 
what distinguishes the occasional from the ‘stalwart’ protester and the extent to which 
different types of political and social values impact on one’s proclivity to become a 
habitual protester.  Moreover, there is also evidence that ideological radicalism – of 
both left and right – is linked to protest activism with support for extremist parties 
positively linked to the level of protest once other national characteristics were taken 
into account (Powell 1982; Dalton and van Sickle 2005). As such, it is important to 
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examine the extent to which attachment to certain values impacts on both the 
frequency and the intensity of protest activism. By speaking to these critical new 
questions in the study of protest and political participation this paper breaks new 
ground while also speaking to classical debates in political science on the role of 
political values for political action which dates back at least to the seminal work of 
Almond and Verba (1963).   
While the literature on political participation and social movements 
distinguishes between economic redistributive and libertarian social values and 
understands their role for spurring on protest in different ways, the literature to date 
has yet to elucidate the link between values and protest participation by specifically 
distinguishing between the redistributive-free market and libertarian-authoritarian 
dimensions. In an attempt to disentangle the different influences of economic and 
social values on the frequency and intensity of protest activism, we theorise that 
economically leftist values will be more likely to be linked to the support of state 
action in society, for example supporting redistribution. On the other hand, libertarian 
social values will be accompanied by a distrust of state action. As a result, we expect 
that the dynamics underpinning the effect of value sets on various degrees of 
participation will be different. We hypothesize that redistributive values mobilise to 
political action mainly through the link with organizations. On the other hand, with 
libertarian values, we expect that extra-institutional participation will be underpinned 
by dissatisfaction with democracy and distrust for organised politics. We theorise that 
more economically redistributive individuals are more likely to desire the political 
intervention of the state to redress distributional inequalities in the population, for 
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example through higher taxes or welfare measures. This means that individuals with 
greater preferences for economic redistribution are more likely to be institutionally 
embedded in organisational networks, both the more conventional – parties and trade 
unions – and the more unconventional – social movement organisations.  On the other 
hand, more social libertarian individuals are more likely to distrust state intervention 
in and regulation in society and as such will be more likely to participate out of 
feelings of frustration with what they perceive as the unsatisfactory (un-)democratic 
standards in the nation, in an attempt to voice their concerns.  Our hypotheses are 
detailed as follows:  
H1:  Economic redistributive values have a positive effect on frequency of extra-
institutional participation.  
H2:  Economic redistributive values have a positive effect on intensity of extra-
institutional participation. 
H3:  Social libertarian values have a positive effect on frequency of extra-institutional 
participation.  
H4:  Social libertarian values have a positive effect on intensity of extra-institutional 
participation.  
H5:  Organisational membership will be the main variable underpinning the effect of 
economic redistributive values on both types of extra-institutional participation.  
H6:  (Dis-)satisfaction with democracy will be the main variable underpinning the 
effect of social libertarian values on both types of extra-institutional action. 
 
 
13 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
This study analyses data from a unique original dataset produced in the context of the 
Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation project. This is a 
collaborative effort, funded by national funding agencies in each participating 
country coordinated through the European Science Foundation (ESF), originally 
including seven countries: Belgium, Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland, and aimed at studying who participates in demonstrations, why and how. 
To do so, national teams of researchers have conducted on-site surveys among 
participants in demonstrations between 2009-2013 following a rigorous standardized 
methodology (van Stekelenburg et al. 2012). A survey questionnaire was handed out 
following a sampling method aimed at generating random samples of demonstrators. 
The questionnaire included questions concerning previous participation in different 
kinds of political activities and political values, and other indicators.  
The project aimed to survey all the most visible large demonstrations (more 
than 3,000 estimated protesters) occurring in each participating country between 
2009-2012. Moreover, face-to-face interviews (achieving an almost perfect response 
rate) were conducted with a sub-sample of respondents to allow for non-response bias 
checks on the mail-back surveys. The method is presented in detail in van 
Stekelenburg et al. (2012). This dataset has been used in a wide variety of 
publications in top international journals in political science, sociology and specialist 
fields: for e.g. American Journal of Sociology (Walgrave and Wouters 2014)  and 
Mobilization (Saunders et al. 2012). 
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We analyse the full dataset of 72 demonstrations in the seven original Western 
European countries – Belgium, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland – that conducted the surveys following the standardized methodology 
and containing over 10,000 respondents. While the countries have different political 
traditions, they are all Western European nations with broadly similar traditions 
making this a design of the “most similar systems”  and studies have shown that 
economic and  social values tend to be understood in similar ways across contexts 
(Dalton 2008). The data are hierarchically structured, so as to lend themselves to 
multilevel analyses in which the individual-level data are nested into the 
demonstration level which in turn is nested into the country level. 
The literature examining extra-institutional participation tends to be limited to 
a handful of indicators. Early studies, particularly those based on the Political Action 
Study and on the World or European Values study by Inglehart (1977, 1990) and 
colleagues tended to employ protest potential scales as dependent variables. These 
types of scales are problematic for investigating the relationship between political 
values and participation, since the dependent variable includes an attitudinal 
dimension in the ‘might do’ option. More left-liberal or post-material individuals will 
be more likely to say they approve of different sorts of protest activism without 
actually engaging in these actions.  More recent studies employ the only other 
indicator of extra-institutional participation available in population studies – a 
dichotomous variable coded as 1 for participation in an activity and 0 for non-
participation. However, this variable does not specify the time frame of activism. 
Additionally, one respondent could have conducted the activity a great deal of times, 
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whereas another might have only participated in it once. As such, this type of 
question also leaves us agnostic in terms of the relationship between political values 
and frequency of political activism. Given that only a small portion of the population 
engages in protest activities at all, asking about frequency of protest in large 
population studies is not generally feasible as it would lead to very small cell counts, 
making disaggregated analysis by groups arduous. 
We employ two new types of indicators of extra-institutional participation: 
frequency of protest in the last 12 months and for intensity, a count measure of the 
number of extra-institutional activities – other than protest – that individuals have 
engaged in the last 12 months. (The activities included were petition; boycotted; 
bought products for political reasons; strike; direct action; violent forms of action.  
Principal component analysis showed that all six items loaded on one component 
with an eigenvalue of 1.7). This provides both a means for addressing different levels 
of protest participation and also for investigating the relative impact of values.   
To reflect the hierarchical nature of the data, and the fact that respondents 
were sampled within demonstration and therefore the fact that their errors are likely 
to be correlated, we apply two-level random-intercept models, with the demonstration 
as the higher level of analysis. Thus, the models in the analysis will be four sets of 
nested mixed effects Poisson models accounting for the influence of first political, 
then social values. 
 Our key independent variables consist of economic values and social values. 
For economic values we combined the two Likert items (Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree) available in the survey. These ranged from 1 meaning Free market 
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and 5 meaning Redistributive from two items: ‘Government should redistribute 
income from the better off to those who are less well off’ and ‘Even the most 
important public services and industries are best left to private enterprise.’ For social 
values we also combined the two Likert items (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
available in the survey.  These ranged from 1 meaning Authoritarian and 5 meaning 
Libertarian from two items: ‘Children should be taught to obey authority’ and ‘People 
from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live in it 
permanently if they want to.’  Both redistributive preference variables loaded onto 
one component with eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.26). The same was true of the 
libertarian pair of preference variables loaded onto one component with eigenvalue 
greater than 1 (1.29). The correlation between leftist and libertarian values is 0.329. 
The models include a number of other variables to capture different mechanisms 
discussed in the literature which might be linking political values, on the one hand, 
and the frequency and intensity of extra-institutional participation, on the other. The 
most important ones measure different degrees of satisfaction with democracy and 
organisational membership. Democratic satisfaction is a continuous scale where 0 
means very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the respondent’s country 
and 10 means very satisfied. Some scholars argue that democratic satisfaction means 
that people accept that others also are playing by the rules and that the system is not 
rigged and therefore that this is a spur to political engagement (Farah 1979). Others 
have suggested that dissatisfaction may spur political activism (Norris 1999, 2011).  
Most importantly for our present purpose, we believe that this variable sheds light on 
what explains the link between political values and extra-institutional participation. If 
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the inclusion of this variable in the models reduces a large part of the effect of 
political values, this indicates that it plays a mediating role explaining why 
individuals with certain types of political values are more prone to political action. 
Organizational membership is a continuous variable measuring the number of 
organizations that the respondent has been involved with in the past 12 months. We 
prefer this more fine-grained indicator to another one, often used in research on the 
impact of organisational embeddedness on political participation, which simply 
distinguish between individuals who are members of at least one organisation and 
those who are not. Individuals who are members of more organisations are more 
likely to be mobilised to political action, either by other members asking them or by 
the spread of information about protests organised by their and other organizations 
(Schussman and Soule 2005; Diani and McAdam 2003). Again, a reduction in the 
effect for either economic or social values with the inclusion of this variable will 
suggest that the reason left-wing and/or libertarian individuals are more likely to 
engage in extra-institutional actions is that their values lead them to joining 
organisations which then mobilise them to participate politically. We also include a 
variable for institutional participation (voted; contacted a politician; worn a badge or 
campaign sticker; donated money to a political campaign. Principal component 
analysis showed all four items loaded only on one component with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1 (1.5)). The inclusion of this variable allows to test, firstly, whether 
individuals who engage in extra-institutional participation shun institutional 
participation as several scholars suggest (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Norris 2002). Additionally, we include a number of controls which 
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allow us to deal with previous accounts of extra-institutional participation. First, 
gender, since the literature has traditionally shown that men are more likely to engage 
in extra-institutional activism than women (Schussman and Soule 2005). Second, we 
include a variable for cohorts or generations, since the literature argued that younger 
cohorts will be more likely than older generations to engage in extra-institutional 
activism gaining prominence and becoming more widespread since the 1960s.  Third, 
the literature tends to argue that more educated people will be more likely to engage 
in political actions and extra-institutional activities in particular, given cognitive 
mobilisation. Fourth, we test the role of occupation and employment status since 
scholarship on political participation tends to argue that individuals in the middle 
classes, and also students, will be more likely to engage (Schussman and Soule 2005). 
However, while the idea of resources is particularly prominent in the political science 
literature and the resource model of political participation (Verba et al. 1995), 
grievance theories (Buechler 2004) on the other hand tend to argue that it is those 
who are relatively deprived and resource poor that will engage in protest activities as 
these are one of the few resources they have left to make their demands heard.   
Each variable is included in step-wise, nested models to see how much of the 
effect of political values is captured with the addition of each explanatory and/or 
control variable and try to account for the relationship between political values – 
whether economic or social – with both forms of protest participation. We include in 
the models predicting the number of extra-institutional activities engaged the variable 
for frequency of demonstrating, and in the models predicting frequency of 
demonstrating the number of extra-institutional activities engaged in, to see whether 
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these two different measures are related. Similarly, in the models aiming to explain 
the relationship between protest activism and left economic values, we include social 
values, whereas in the models aiming to explain the relationship between protest 
activism and libertarian social values we include economic values at the end.  
 
FINDINGS  
Moving to the findings, Table 1 and Figure 1 show the mean value on a scale from 1 
to 5 where 1 means Free market and 5 means Redistributive for someone engaging in 
0 out of 6 activities is 3.73, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.50. 
Also, the mean value on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Authoritarian and 5 
means Libertarian for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities is 2.69 whereas for 
someone engaging in 4 or more it is 3.67. Clearly, there is a strong positive 
relationship between being more economically redistributive and engaging in a 
greater number of activities in a given year. Similarly, there is a strong positive 
relationship between being more socially libertarian and engaging in a greater 
number of activities in a given year.  
Table 1 & Figure 1 
The results are very similar when we look at frequency of protest (Table 2). 
The mean value on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Free market and 5 means 
Redistributive for someone attending only 1 demonstration is 3.93, whereas for 
someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.61. Also from Table 2, the mean value on a 
scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means Authoritarian and 5 means Libertarian for someone 
engaging in 0 out of 6 activities is 2.96 whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it 
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is 4.06.  Again, being more left-wing and also being more socially libertarian have 
strong positive effects on extra-institutional participation. 
Table 2 & Figure 2 
Now we turn to the mixed effects Poisson models. There is a strong positive 
effect of more economically leftist values on intensity of engagement in extra-
institutional activities (Table 3), and the same holds true for more social libertarian 
values (Table 4) as with both social and economic values on frequency of protest 
(Tables 5 and 6). This evidence therefore confirms H1-H4. By and large, while most 
effects are similar for the two dependent measures of protest participation it is 
striking that gender is significant for across all models in Tables 3 and 4 when 
predicting intensity but when looking at the dependent variable for frequency in 
Tables 5 and 6, gender is no longer a significant effect.  A similar pattern exists for 
cohort effects.  These findings suggest that frequency is less likely to be patterned by 
socio-demographics than intensity and is rather more likely to be linked to other 
variables known to affect protest such as commitment and network effects.  
For explaining the relationship between intensity of engagement in extra-
institutional activities and more economically redistributive values (Table 3), the 
greatest reduction in the effect of values occurs with the inclusion of organizational 
membership in Model 7, confirming H5. Also frequency of demonstrating in Model 
9, institutional participation in Model 8, and libertarian social values in Model 10 also 
appear to mediate this relationship. This suggests that more economically 
redistributive people engage in more extra-institutional activities because they tend to 
become members of organizations which mobilise them to action and also to be 
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individuals which are generally very politically active – both in the extra- and 
institutional repertoires. In short, it appears having leftist values leads individuals to 
join organizations mobilising them to activism.  
A different pattern can be observed when it comes to explaining the 
relationship between engagement in extra-institutional activities and more libertarian 
social values (Table 4). Here the greatest reduction in the effect of values occurs with 
the inclusion of democratic (dis-)satisfaction in Model 6, confirming H6. Also, 
frequency of demonstrating in Model 9, economic social values in Model 10 reduce 
the effect. To a lesser extent, institutional participation also appears to mediate this 
relationship. This suggests that, where organizational membership is particularly 
important for explaining why individuals with more economically leftist values 
engaged in a greater number of extra-institutional activities, it appears that what 
explains why more social libertarian people tend to engage in more protest actions is 
that they are dissatisfied with democracy, leading them to engage politically, and 
particularly through extra-institutional means.  
In terms of explaining the relationship between greater frequency of protest 
and more economically redistributive values (Table 5), the greatest reduction in the 
effect of values occurs with the inclusion of organizational membership (Model 7), 
again confirming H5. Also extra-institutional activism (in Model 9), and there is also 
some effect of institutional participation (Model 8) and libertarian social values 
(Model 10). Interestingly, therefore, this shows a pattern for explaining the effect of 
economic values on extra-institutional activism since the results are very similar in 
this frequency measure to those of the count measure of activities (Table 3). The 
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main story here appears to be that more economically redistributive individuals are 
more likely to engage with organisations and to be mobilised to engage politically, 
through both institutional and extra-institutional means.  
Table 3 & Table 4 & Table 5 
Just as with the count measure, explaining the relationship between greater 
frequency of protest and more libertarian social values (Table 6) (dis-)satisfaction 
with democracy stands as an important factor, supporting again H6. Also, 
organizational membership, institutional participation, extra-institutional participation 
and also having more redistributive economic values contribute to reducing the effect. 
Again, (dis-)satisfaction with democracy underlines explanation for why more 
libertarian people tend to be more likely to be involved in protest activities. For 
economic values, the key variable, as we have shown, instead is organisational 
membership. This suggests that while economic values’ impact on protest activism is 
underpinned by organisational embeddedness, on the other hand, for libertarianism it 
is the desire to voice discontent with the present arrangements that is most central. 
The relative reduction in the effect sizes when the mediators are included in the 
models are shown in Figure 3. Additionally, we ran some interaction tests on the full 
models (not shown here but available from the authors) to test for moderator effects 
and found significant effects for both organizational membership with respect to 
economic values (for both measures of protest) and for democratic dissatisfaction 
with respect to social values (for the intensity measure). We also found significant 
effects for the interaction between economically redistributive and socially libertarian 
values for both dependent variables. These results thus provide evidence also of 
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moderator effects: economic and social values translate more easily into participation 
the broader the organizational membership networks and the more felt the feelings of 
democratic dissatisfaction. Moreover, we also found some evidence of moderator 
effects between the values showing that the more one is economically redistributive 
the greater the likelihood that social libertarian values will also be activated into 
participation and vice-versa. This fits into previous findings that left-libertarians are 
key constituencies of social movements (Kriesi 1989).  
Table 6 & Figure 3 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Extra-institutional forms of political participation have become increasingly 
important and widespread and values are an important driver of political 
participation. In this paper, we investigated the impact of political values on the 
intensity and frequency of protest participation. Our study has a number of important 
features which allow us to develop on previous research and extend knowledge in the 
field. Theoretically, the most important feature is embedded in our main goal: 
disentangling the relationship between political values and different degrees of 
engagement in extra-institutional activities. We accomplished this by looking at both 
high intensity and lower incidence activists. This is a feature of our study that only 
the kind of data from activist surveys that we are using allows. At the same time, it is 
important to stress that, given these data, our analysis and findings should be 
interpreted as applying only to actual protesters.  Moreover, if panel data were 
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available in the future we would be able to test for any feedback effects from 
participation to values in turn.  
The key finding of our investigation is that, while both economically 
redistributive values and libertarian social values are important for engaging in a 
number of extra-institutional activities and for protesting frequently, we observe a 
different impact of economic and social value priorities and on extra-institutional 
activism. For both the count measure and the frequency measure, the results of the 
data analysis show that more economically redistributive individuals are more likely 
to join organizations that facilitate spread of information also from other similar 
organisation and agencies to mobilise them to both extra-institutional and institutional 
political action. More economically redistributive people are more likely to 
participate in a range of activities and this in turn might be since their political beliefs 
and their distaste for inequality are likely to provide strong motivations to engage 
politically to change the current institutions. Particularly in the context of the 
economic crisis, austerity, and wide-ranging budget cuts disproportionately affecting 
the poorest, could push them to voice their dissent with principles they do not share 
in.  
On the other hand, (dis-)satisfaction with democracy stands out as the main 
driving factor linking libertarian social values to protest activism (Farah 1979). It 
seems thus that more socially libertarian people are particularly (dis-)satisfied with 
the gap between promise and reality in West European democracies, for example as 
symbolised in the convergence between major parties leaving no room for democratic 
choice  or  the curtailment of civil liberties and the great powers afforded to the police 
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and other authorities in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent discourse around the 
need for social control and monitoring to avoid potential threats (Tarrow 2015).   
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Table 1. Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating ) 
 Number of extra-institutional activities other than protest engaged in last 12 months 
 0 1 2 3 4+ 
Economic values scale mean  
(1 Free market – 5 Redistributive) 
3.73*** 3.89*** 4.12*** 4.35*** 4.50*** 
Social values scale mean  
(1 Authoritarian  – 5 Libertarian)  
2.69*** 2.91*** 3.18*** 3.38*** 3.67*** 
Notes: Significance stars based on ANOVA and one-tailed comparison of means tests, based on total sample N: 10,012 
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Table 2.  Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months) 
 Number of times demonstrated in the last 12 months  
 1 time  2-5 times 6-10 11-20  21+  
Economic values scale mean  
(1 Free market – 5 Redistributive)  
3.93*** 4.26*** 4.63*** 4.62*** 4.61*** 
Social values scale mean  
(1 Authoritarian  – 5 Libertarian)  
2.96*** 3.30*** 3.79*** 3.95*** 4.06*** 
Notes: Significance stars based on ANOVA and and one-tailed comparison of means tests, based on total sample N: 10,012 
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Table 3. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Economic Values on Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating)  
Groups: 72, N: 10,012 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5    m6 m7 m8 m9 m10    
Fixed Effects            
Economic Values (Redistributive)   0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male  -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cohorts           
Post-WWII generation    -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. 1960s/70s generation           
           
1980s generation   0.05** 0.05** 0.05**  0.05** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**  
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
1990s/00s generation   0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education           
RC. Secondary school or lower            
           
BA or equivalent    0.05** 0.05*   0.05* 0.05* 0.03 0.04* 0.03 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MA or higher degree    0.03* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Occupation           
Salariat     0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Intermediate Professions     0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. Working Class           
           
Unemployed     -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Students     0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Democratic satisfaction       -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Organizational membership       0.09*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional participation        0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Frequency of demonstrating         0.12*** 0.11*** 
         (0.01) (0.01) 
Social Values (Libertarian)          0.05*** 
          (0.01) 
Constant ߛ00  0.31*** 0.34*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.06 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Random Effects           
ı2u  0.036 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.028 0.026 0.023 0.020 0.017 
- Log Likelihood  -16170.5 -16155.4 -16116.1 -16112 -16110.9 -16073.31 -15986.24 -15917.89 -15841.93 -15822.64 
BIC 32368.61 32347.64 32296.69 32306.83 32341.58 32275.58 32110.65 31983.17 31840.45 31811.09 
AIC  32346.97 32318.79 32246.21 32241.93 32247.83 32174.61 32002.48 31867.78 31717.86 31681.28 
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Table 4. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Social Values on Intensity of Extra-Institutional Participation (Count Except for Demonstrating)  
Groups: 72, N: 10,012 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5    m6 m7 m8 m9 m10    
Fixed Effects            
Social Values (Libertarian) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01 
Male  -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01 
Cohorts           
Post-WWII generation    -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03 
RC. 1960s/70s generation           
           
1980s generation   0.04* 0.04* 0.04*   0.05* 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06**  
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
1990s/00s generation   0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education           
RC. Secondary school or lower            
           
BA or equivalent    0.05** 0.04*   0.05* 0.05* 0.03 0.04* 0.03 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MA or higher degree    0.04* 0.03 0.04* 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Occupation           
Salariat     0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Intermediate Professions     0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. Working Class           
           
Unemployed     -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Students     -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Democratic satisfaction       -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Organizational membership       0.09*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional participation        0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Frequency of demonstrating         0.12*** 0.11*** 
         (0.01) (0.01) 
Economic Values (Redistributive)            0.08*** 
          (0.01) 
Constant ߛ00  0.51*** 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.64*** 0.45*** 0.37*** 0.23*** -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Random Effects           
ı2u  0.032 0.031 0.031 0.031 0 .032          0.027 0.025 0.022 0.019 0.017    
- Log Likelihood -16167.83 -16158.5 -16132.11 -16127.98 -16126.99 -16093.21 -16001.49 -15923.8 -15852.9 -15822.64 
BIC 32363.29 32353.85 32328.71 32338.86 32373.73 32315.38 32141.16 31994.98 31862.4 31811.09 
AIC  32341.65 32325 32278.22 32273.96 32279.98 32214.42 32032.99 31879.59 31739.8 31681.28 
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Table 5. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Economic Values on Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months)  
Groups: 72, N: 10,012 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5    m6 m7 m8 m9 m10    
Fixed Effects            
Economic Values (Redistributive)   0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.03**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cohorts           
Post-WWII generation    0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. 1960s/70s generation           
           
1980s generation   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
1990s/00s generation   -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education           
RC. Secondary school or lower            
           
BA or equivalent    -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MA or higher degree    -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04*   
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Occupation           
Salariat     -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Intermediate Professions     -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. Working Class           
           
Unemployed     -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Students     -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Democratic satisfaction       -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Organizational membership       0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional participation        0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Extra-institutional activism         0.07*** 0.06*** 
         (0.01) (0.01) 
Social Values (Libertarian)          0.05*** 
          (0.01) 
Constant ߛ00  0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.43*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.19** 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Random Effects           
ı2u  0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.010            
- Log Likelihood -13599.53 -13598.58 -13597.89 -13596.26 -13594.87 -13575.22 -13509.74 -13483.53 -13441.8 -13428.3 
BIC 27226.7 27234 27260.26 27275.42 27309.5 27279.4 27157.66 27114.44 27040.2 27022.42 
AIC  27205.06 27205.16 27209.78 27210.51 27215.75 27178.44 27049.48 26999.06 26917.6 26892.61 
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Table 6. Multi-level Mixed Effects Poisson Models Accounting for Influence of Social Values on Frequency of Demonstrating (Number of Times in Last 12 Months) 
Groups: 72, N: 10,012 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5    m6 m7 m8 m9 m10    
Fixed Effects            
Social Values (Libertarian) 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Male  0.03* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cohorts           
Post-WWII generation    0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. 1960s/70s generation           
           
1980s generation   -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
1990s/00s generation   -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education           
RC. Secondary school or lower            
           
BA or equivalent    -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MA or higher degree    -0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04* -0.04* -0.04*   
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02 
Occupation           
Salariat     -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Intermediate Professions     -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
RC. Working Class           
           
Unemployed     -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Students     -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
      (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Democratic satisfaction       -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Organizational membership       0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional participation        0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Extra-institutional activism         0.06*** 0.06*** 
         (0.01) (0.01) 
Economic Values (Redistributive)            0.03**  
          (0.01) 
Constant ߛ00  0.36*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.51*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Random Effects           
ı2u  0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.010 
- Log Likelihood -13587.7 -13585.5 -13583.6 -13581.5 -13580.4 -13564.21 -13498.19 -13470.75 -13432 -13428.3 
BIC 27203.1 27207.8 27231.6 27245.84 27280.56 27257.39 27134.55 27088.89 27020.59 27022.42 
AIC  27181.47 27178.95 27181.11 27180.93 27186.81 27156.43 27026.38 26973.5 26897.99 26892.61 
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Figure 3.  Reduction in direct effects when mediators are included in the models  
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Material: Demographic snapshot of protesters   
 
Gender: Men 52% Women 48% 
 
Cohorts:  Post-WWII 9% Baby-boomers 25% 80s Generation 22% 90s Generation 17% 00s Generation 27% 
 
Education levels: Secondary school or lower 33% BA 23%  MA or above 44% 
 
Occupation: Salariat 56% Intermediate Professions 15% Working Class 8% Unemployed 6% Students 15% 
0.14 
0.12 
0.09 0.09 
0.12 
0.1 
0.07 
0.09 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
Intensity -
economic values
Intensity -social
values
Frequency -
economic values
Frequency - social
values
direct effect effect when mediator included in model
36 
 
 
Appendix: List of demonstrations surveyed by each national team  
 
Belgium 
1. Antwerp, 1st of May March (2010) 
2. Brussels, Climate Change (2009) 
3. Brussels, March for Work (2010) 
4. Brussels, No to Austerity (2010) 
5. Brussels, No Government, Great Country (2011) 
6. Brussels, Not in Our Name (2011) 
7. Brussels, Non-Profit Demonstration (2011) 
8. Brussels, We have alternatives (2011) 
9. Brussels, Fukushima never again (2012) 
 
Britain  
10. London, National Climate March (2009) 
11. London, May Day Labour March (2010) 
12. London, Take Back Parliament (2010) 
13. London, No to Hate Crime Vigil (2010) 
14. London, Unite Against Fascism National Demo (2010) 
15. London, Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (2010) 
16. London, National Climate March 2010 (2010) 
17. London, Second Student National Demo (2010) 
18. London, Million Women Rise (2011) 
19. London, 'TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (2011) 
20. London, Occupy London (2011) 
21. London, London Pride Parade (2012) 
 
Italy  
22. Assisi, Marcia Perugia-Assisi (2011) 
23. Bologna, Gay Pride (2012) 
24. Firenze, Semi di giustizia, fiori di corresponsabilità (2013) 
25. Florence, May Day (2011) 
26. Florence, General Strike (2011)    
27. Florence, Florence 10+10/Joining forces for another Europe (2012) 
28. Milan, Euromayday (2011) 
29. Niscemi, No Mous (2013) 
30. Rome, No Monti Day (2012) 
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The Netherlands  
31. Amsterdam, Student demo 1 (2010) 
32. Amsterdam, Culture demo Amsterdam (2010) 
33. Amsterdam, Stop racism and exclusion (2011) 
34. Amsterdam, Anti Nucleair demo (2011) 
35. Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Occupy Netherlands (2011) 
36. Haarlem, Pink Saturday Parade Survey (2012) 
37. Rotterdam, Retirement demonstration (2009) 
38. The Hague, Together strong for public work (2011) 
39. The Hague, Student demo 2 (2011) 
40. The Hague, Military demo (2011) 
41. The Hague, Stop budget cuts (care & welfare) (2011) 
42. Utrecht, Climate demo (2009) 
43. Utrecht, Culture demo Utrecht (2010) 
 
Spain   
44. Barcelona, Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (2010) 
45. Barcelona, Self-determination is democracy (2010) 
46. Barcelona, We are a nation, we decide (2010) 
47. Barcelona, 1st May, Labour Day (2010) 
49. Madrid, Against Labor Law (2010) 
50. Madrid, Real Democracy Now! We are not good in the hands of politicians 
and  bankers! (2011) 
51. Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against language decree (2010) 
52. Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against the new labour law (2010) 
53. Vigo, Celebration May Day (2011) 
54. Vigo, For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights (2011) 
 
Sweden  
55. Copenhagen (mostly Danish & Swedish respondents), Climate March (2009) 
56. Gothenburg, May Day (Left Party) (2012) 
57. Gothenburg, May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (2012) 
58. Gothenburg, Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ festival) (2012) 
59. Malmö, May Day (Left Party) (2011) 
60. Malmö, May Day (SAP/LO) (2011) 
61. Stockholm, May 1 March, Left Party (2010) 
62. Stockholm, Against racist politics (2010) 
63. Stockholm, May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (2010) 
64. Stockholm, Anti-nuclear demonstration (2011) 
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Switzerland  
65. Bern, World March of Women (2010) 
66. Beznau, Anti Nuclear Manifestation (2011)   
67. Geneva, Gay Pride Geneva (2011) 
68. Geneva, Women demonstration Geneva (2011) 
69. Geneva, May 1ste demonstration 2011 (2011) 
70. Mühleberg, Anti-nuclear (2012) 
71. Zurich, May 1st Demonstration (2010)   
72. Zurich, Pride demonstration (2012) 
